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I. Introduction 
Professor Enrique Armijo’s excellent article on the history of 
the “Ample Alternative Channels” Doctrine1 provides plausible 
answers to two of the most important questions—“what” and 
“how”—raised by this problematic rule. What have courts done 
when presented with speech restrictions that supposedly leave 
“ample alternative channels” for speech? Armijo provides a 
thorough catalog of the major cases that have invoked ample 
alternative channels, both in upholding speech restrictions and 
(occasionally) in striking them down.2 And how can our First 
                                                                                                     
 *   Legal Associate, Cato Institute Center for Constitutional Studies. 
 1.  Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1659 (2016).  
 2.  See id. at 1705–22 (discussing the conflict between the ample 
alternative channels doctrine and free speech zone cases, adult entertainment 
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Amendment jurisprudence be improved so that such unjustified 
restrictions on speech are not upheld in the future? Armijo gives 
a convincing answer, namely that courts must require the 
government to show that the use of a particular channel of speech 
is incompatible with a government interest.3  
Rather than attempting to improve on Armijo’s work on 
these two questions, this response will focus instead on a third 
question: Why. Why has the Ample Alternative Channels 
Doctrine (AAC) so firmly taken hold in our judicial canon? 
Professor Armijo provides the first half of an answer to this 
question with his engrossing and revelatory behind-the-scenes 
account of Justice Harlan’s O’Brien concurrence.4 The history 
behind Harlan’s opinion tells the AAC origin story. But this still 
leaves unanswered why courts have accepted, applied, and even 
expanded the AAC doctrine for over forty years since O’Brien, 
seldom noting dissent or even concern with the implications of 
the test.5  
This response will examine several factors that have 
contributed to the AAC doctrine’s resilience, and will also suggest 
possible solutions to counteract these factors and thereby move 
away from the AAC doctrine. The most basic cause of the 
doctrine’s longevity, I propose, is linguistic. The concept of a 
“channel” of speech may seem simple enough. Yet, in fact, courts 
have used the word “channel” to describe three distinct elements 
of speech transmission.6 The failure to distinguish between these 
meanings has led to a blurring of the lines between regulations 
that truly affect speech and those that do not.7 
                                                                                                     
cases, prohibited means cases, and abortion clinic protest cases ). 
 3.  See id. at 1728–38 (providing as a solution the “incompatibility test”). 
 4.  See id. at 1670 (“Alternative channels analysis was born . . . in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence. And an earlier version of that latter opinion had much 
bigger game in its sights: what Harlan viewed as the dangerous logical fallacy of 
the Court’s distinguishing between speech and content in First Amendment 
cases.”); id. at 1671–89 (providing the background of Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in O’Brien).  
 5.  See id. at 1668 (noting that although the “ample alternative channels 
analysis was in its incipiency a misguided afterthought . . . the concept now 
carries dispositive force in First Amendment doctrine”). 
 6.  See infra Part II (discussing the three meanings or “categories” of the 
term “channels”). 
 7.  Id. 
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But a simple linguistic misunderstanding cannot be the full 
explanation. An additional problem arises from the 
misapplication of what Armijo calls the “marketplace theory” of 
the First Amendment.8 Courts have overwhelmingly applied the 
marketplace theory when analyzing speech restrictions, justifying 
the value of speech based on its contribution to the marketplace 
of ideas.9 This has been to the detriment of speakers challenging 
speech restrictions, who have been forced to prove that their 
speech (in its intended form) is unique and irreplaceable. If a 
regulation seems to remove easily replaceable speech from the 
marketplace, then that regulation is frequently upheld as having 
no real harm.10 
The answer to these errors, I propose, is not to move to the 
alternative “self-autonomy” theory,11 which focuses on the rights 
of speakers rather than the effects on listeners.12 That theory is 
implausible as a definition of speech rights since it can protect 
choices unrelated to the perception of an audience. Instead, the 
answer is to move to a modified version of the marketplace 
theory, one that is still listener-focused but not open to judicial 
balancing. Under this view, any regulation that affects the 
experience of listeners is a violation of free speech rights. The job 
of courts should be limited to determining only whether a 
regulation has altered the experience of listeners. Once this 
objective line is crossed, the regulation qualifies as a speech 
restriction and should only be upheld if it passes a strict test such 
as the one Armijo proposes. 13 
                                                                                                     
 8.  See Armijo, supra note 1, at 1705 (“Ample alternative channels 
respects marketplace theory in those cases where alternatives are found to be 
poor substitutes, but disrespects marketplace theory in those cases where 
alternatives are found to be proper substitutes.”). 
 9.  See id. at 1696 (describing marketplace theory as “the dominant theory 
of the First Amendment”). 
 10.  See id. at 1665 (“The restrained expression can thus still contribute to 
the search for truth, so the harm the restriction causes, both to the speaker and 
to listeners participating in the broader speech market, is minimal.”). 
 11.  See generally id. at 1689–95 (discussing the self-autonomy theory). 
 12.  See id. at 1690–91 (“Accordingly, for self-autonomy theory, it is the 
speaker’s choice of expression that is . . . ‘the crucial factor in justifying 
protection’ of that expression.” (quoting C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 52 (1989))). 
 13.  See infra Part IV (elaborating on this solution). 
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Finally, I will consider why courts have been willing to use 
the AAC doctrine to uphold regulations that manifestly interfere 
with the content of a speaker’s message, such as the regulation in 
O’Brien. One reason, I will argue, is that courts wish to avoid an 
uncomfortable fact: if breaking a law is a uniquely powerful form 
of expression against that law, then enforcing the law inherently 
places an asymmetrical burden on critics of the status quo. For a 
legal regime that prides itself on striving for viewpoint neutrality, 
this asymmetry is not only an unfortunate fact, but also an 
unavoidable one. Courts should acknowledge it, so as to be 
clear-eyed in measuring the burden that a regulation places on 
speakers.14 
II. The Three Meanings of “Channel” 
Much of the confusion surrounding the “ample alternative 
channel” doctrine arises from linguistic imprecision. Laying out 
the three possible meanings of the word “channel” at the outset 
will help clarify the distinctions drawn later in this response. 
First, there are cases where two different “channels” can be 
used to carry the same message to the same set of recipients. For 
example, suppose that a letter could be carried by truck to your 
city and then placed in your mailbox on Wednesday morning. 
Alternatively, that same letter could be carried to your city by 
plane and then placed in your mailbox on Wednesday morning. 
The truck and the plane are two alternative “channels” by which 
the message might travel. But, regardless of which channel is 
chosen, your perception, as the recipient of the message, is 
identical in every way. No matter what, you will find the same 
letter in your mailbox on Wednesday morning. I will call this type 
of channel a “Category I” channel. 
Second, there are cases where two different “channels” can be 
used to carry the same message to two different sets of recipients. 
For example, suppose that an open letter could be publically 
disseminated either via flyers posted around a town or via a post 
on an internet blog. The letter consists entirely of text, and the 
speaker intends the text to be the full extent of the letter’s 
                                                                                                     
 14.  See infra Part V (exploring why courts have upheld restrictions on 
speech where two different channels can be used to carry different messages). 
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message. In this case, everyone who sees the letter receives the 
same message, whether they read it on a flyer or on a blog. But 
the number of people who see the message, and the identity of 
those people, may well differ depending on which of these two 
channels is used.15 I will call this type of channel a “Category II” 
channel.16 
Third, and finally, there are cases where two different 
“channels” can be used to carry different messages.17 For example, 
suppose that an anti-materialist message could be delivered by 
means of either burning a real $100 bill or burning a fake $100 
bill. The real bill and the fake bill are two different “channels” by 
which—through the means of a dramatic demonstration—an 
anti-materialist message could be delivered. But because they are 
two different objects being burned (only one of them representing 
an actual sacrifice on the part of the burner), the message 
received by viewers of the two potential demonstrations would be 
different. I will call this type of channel a “Category III” channel. 
With this terminology laid out, the next section will explore 
the category where courts have most frequently used the AAC 
doctrine to uphold speech restrictions: Category II cases.  
                                                                                                     
 15.  For example, the flyers may be read only by the residents of a 
particular locality, while the blog post may be read by a much more 
geographically dispersed audience (which, if the issue is one of local politics, 
may be less desired by the speaker). 
 16.  In these Category II cases, speakers are harmed by being deprived of 
what Armijo calls a “technique” of disseminating their messages. See Armijo, 
supra note 1, at 1684 (arguing that “the availability of alternative means seems 
much more relevant to a law that incidentally burdens speech by banning 
‘techniques’ for expression than to a law that bans the expressive act itself”). As 
Armijo explains, the term “technique” was first used by Justice Black. Id. at 
1684 n.121. In Martin v. Struthers, Black wrote that “door to door campaigning 
is one of the most accepted techniques of seeking popular support.” Martin v. 
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (emphasis added). A Category II ban 
is “a restriction on one ‘technique’ by which a message can be expressed.” 
Armijo, supra note 1, at 1684. 
 17.  These are the situations where, as Ed Baker puts it, “the intended 
meaning of people’s expression relates to the time or the place or the manner of 
the expression.” C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory 
Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
937, 946 (1984). This category corresponds to the “associative conduct” category 
of cases that Armijo describes—cases where “the relevant speech’s intended 
message and effects, along with its particular audience, are inextricably 
associated with the message’s mode, time, and place.” Armijo, supra note 1, at 
1735. 
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III. Restrictions on Audience: The Quintessential “Ample 
Alternative Channels” Case 
The most common “Category II” speech restrictions may be 
regulations that prevent people from speaking in certain physical 
locations. Frequently, such regulations come in the form of a 
so-called “buffer zone,” a rule preventing speakers from coming 
within a certain distance of a sensitive area.18 Buffer zones affect 
who will receive a speaker’s intended message. For example, a 
buffer that prevented protesters from approaching the site of a 
World Trade Organization (WTO) conference “unquestionably 
limited the barred speakers from reaching the speech 
marketplace of their choice—those individuals the protestors 
most sought to persuade, i.e., the WTO delegates themselves, as 
well as others closely following the conference.”19 
How have courts ruled in these cases? Most often, as 
Professor Armijo catalogs, the regulations have survived thanks 
to the AAC doctrine.20 But it may be those rare cases in which 
regulations have been struck down that are the most telling. In 
McCullen v. Coakley,21 the Supreme Court struck down a law that 
banned approaching persons to engage them in conversation 
within 35 feet of an abortion clinic.22 Why did this buffer zone fail 
                                                                                                     
 18.  See Armijo, supra note 1, at 1718 (“A typical example is from Clift v. 
City of Burlington, Vermont, in which Burlington adopted a 35-foot radius 
around reproductive health care facilities in the city. Burlington’s ordinance 
decreed that ‘no person or persons shall knowingly congregate, patrol, picket, or 
demonstrate in the buffer zone.’” (citing Clift v. City of Burlington, Vt., 925 F. 
Supp. 2d 614 (D. Vt. 2013))). Another case involving abortion clinic buffer zones 
is Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). Cases involving protesters of 
conferences and events include Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); 
Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 557 
F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2008); and American Civil Liberties Union of 
Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Col. 2008). 
 19.  Armijo, supra note 1, at 1702 (citing Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 
F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 20.  See id. at 1718 (“The question then becomes whether that physical 
separation impermissibly impedes on the speakers’ expression. And through the 
use of ample alternative channels analysis, courts consistently hold that it does 
not.”). 
 21.  134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 22.  See id. at 2541 (concluding that “the extreme step of closing a 
substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers” is not 
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where so many others succeeded? Perhaps the most important 
clue is that the Court described the ban as interfering with “the 
close, personal conversations that [the petitioners] view as 
essential to ‘sidewalk counseling.’”23 In other words, the speakers 
were helped by having a unique and specific method of 
communication, one that the Court could easily grasp as being 
connected in a special way to the area in which they wished to 
speak. 
Similarly, in Weinberg v. City of Chicago,24 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit easily understood why the author 
of an anti-Chicago Blackhawks book would particularly wish to 
reach attendees at Blackhawks games.25 As a result, a restriction 
banning sales of the book near the Blackhawks arena on game 
days was struck down.26 
In considering other Category II restrictions besides “buffer 
zones,” courts have likewise only protected the most specifically 
targeted speech. One such case was the ban on “signs ‘affixed to 
any wooden, plastic, or other type of support’ during parades and 
public assemblies.”27 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that a sign held aloft 
during a Nazi parade would reach a particular set of people (the 
attendees), a set that would otherwise have been impossible to 
reach as a group.28 The court thus readily understood why a 
                                                                                                     
“consistent with the First Amendment”). 
 23.  Id. at 2535. 
 24.  310 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 25.  See id. at 1042 (“His intended audience is Chicago Blackhawks fans. 
The most opportune time and place to reach this audience is outside the United 
Center, before and after Blackhawks home games.”). 
 26.  See id. (holding that “the peddling ordinance is not a reasonable time, 
place, and manner restriction”). 
 27.  Armijo, supra note 1, at 1704 (quoting Edwards v. City of Coeur 
D’Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 28.  See Edwards, 262 F.3d at 867 
Because there is no other effective and economical way for an 
individual to communicate his or her message to a broad audience 
during a parade or public assembly than to attach a handle to his 
sign to hoist it high in the air, Section 1(D) of Ordinance 2920 
prevents Edwards from reaching his intended audience. We conclude, 
therefore, that Ordinance 2920(1)(D) also does not comport with the 
third prong of the time, place, and manner test because it does not 
allow for ample alternative means of communication. 
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protester would want his anti-Nazi message to be visible to those 
attending the Nazi rally. 
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
upheld a ban on Sunday openings of adult stores, on the grounds 
that “the statute allows those who choose to hear, view, or 
participate publicly in sexually explicit expressive activity more 
than thirty-six hundred hours per year to do so.”29 An adult store 
almost surely would have reached more total listeners in the 
additional 728 hours per year it wished to remain open on 
Sundays than Weinberg reached by standing outside Chicago 
Blackhawks games. But because no particular group of relevant 
people was likely to visit an adult store on Sunday, the store’s 
claim was unsuccessful. 
What should we take away from these decisions? Courts in 
category II cases can certainly be sympathetic to the plight of 
those who are prevented from reaching their intended audience. 
But for such sympathy to be determinative, courts have 
demanded an explanation for why that intended audience is 
particularly relevant to the message being expressed. The AAC 
doctrine is the vehicle by which courts have upheld Category II 
restrictions that do not—in the judge’s view—involve bans on 
reaching uniquely relevant audiences. And so to answer the 
question of why courts have found the AAC doctrine attractive, 
we must understand why they have placed such an emphasis on 
the fit between speech and audience.  
In the next section, I will focus on that explanation: courts 
have implicitly applied a stunted version of what Armijo calls the 
“marketplace theory” of speech rights.  
IV. Toward a Better Version of the Marketplace Theory 
A. The Marketplace Theory as Currently Applied 
As Armijo explains, “Marketplace theory defines the First 
Amendment’s primary function as facilitating a process by which 
truth can be reached.”30 For our purposes, the most important 
                                                                                                     
 29.  Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 126 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 30.  Armijo, supra note 1, at 1696.  
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attribute of marketplace theory is that it “is listener-based in its 
orientation; it is listeners who are witnesses to the truth-finding 
function taking place within the marketplace of ideas.”31 The 
marketplace theory is thus fundamentally instrumentalist; it 
favors the protection of speech only as a means to the end of a 
more informed populace.  
From this listener-focused perspective, the actions of judges 
in Category II cases makes more sense. If speech is useful 
because of its effects on listeners, then we can understand why 
judges would have more sympathy for speech that is specifically 
targeted to particular listeners (and often urging those listeners 
to take a particular action, such as asking Blackhawks fans to 
lobby for a change in the team’s mascot).  
But this listener-focused approach also has a troubling 
consequence. Speech that is targeted to a particular audience has 
a better chance of overcoming a Category II restriction than 
speech that a speaker simply wishes to broadcast to as many 
people as possible. This means that the content of speech is 
influencing the level of protection it receives. Such favoritism, 
though unintended, is a serious blow to the principle of content-
neutrality toward which First Amendment jurisprudence strives. 
B. The Self-Autonomy Theory 
Given the negative consequences of the marketplace theory 
as currently applied, what should be done to help lead courts in a 
better direction? One obvious possibility is to urge a rejection of 
the listener-focused marketplace theory entirely.  
As Armijo explains, the main alternative to the marketplace 
theory is the self-autonomy theory, which focuses on the liberty of 
the speaker.32 The self-autonomy theory values freedom of speech 
because that freedom allows each individual to exercise “the 
ability to think on one’s own, to choose one’s audience, to speak 
with that audience, and to express and receive ideas, so as to 
                                                                                                     
 31.  Id. at 1698. 
 32.  See id. at 1696 (noting “that much of First Amendment scholarship 
undertakes as its primary task the decoupling of self-autonomy theory from 
marketplace theory, and then arguing over which supplies a better justification 
for supporting the freedom of speech”). 
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achieve that best version of oneself through reason, reflection, 
and exchange.”33 Whether the speech convinces an audience—or 
even whether it is relevant to an audience—has no bearing on the 
question of whether that speech merits protection under the 
self-autonomy theory. Instead, “it is the speaker’s choice of 
expression that is . . . ‘the crucial factor in justifying protection’ of 
that expression.”34 
Does the self-autonomy theory represent the solution to the 
overly deferential approach judges have taken in Category II 
cases? Should judges switch to a pure speaker-focused self-
autonomy theory, rejecting all attempts at line-drawing based on 
the effects on the listener? Many have made a strong case for 
moving to the self-autonomy theory, including Charles Fried, on 
whom Armijo principally relies in expounding the case for the 
theory.35 Fried declares the self-autonomy theory to be superior to 
the instrumentalist marketplace theory by suggesting that 
several aspects of our current First Amendment doctrine would 
have to be discarded if we truly accepted the marketplace theory. 
I do not believe, however, that Fried’s arguments are 
determinative in the debate. 
First, Fried suggests that under the marketplace theory we 
would lose the right not to speak a message with which we 
disagree, a right currently protected by West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette36 and subsequent cases.37 Fried argues that 
there is no logical reason to protect such a right under the 
marketplace theory. If we protect speech rights only so that more 
ideas can be added to the marketplace, Fried reasons, then there 
                                                                                                     
 33.  Id. at 1690. 
 34.  Id. at 1690–91 (quoting C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 592 (1989)). 
 35.  See id. at 1689–90 (“Summarizing the moral case for individual choice, 
Charles Fried writes that ‘[t]he capacity for judgment, to make plans, to choose 
one’s good, is what we share with other persons’; indeed, this capacity is ‘what 
makes us persons.’” (quoting CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS 
OF GOVERNMENT 56-57 (2007))). 
 36.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 37.  See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat 
to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 227 (1992) (“The real trouble begins when this 
conception of the First Amendment is pressed further to deny free speech 
protection to speakers who wish not to pronounce certain views.”). 
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is no justification for a constitutional right to withhold an idea 
from the marketplace. 
But this objection is only to one version of the marketplace 
theory. Rather than preserving a liberty to add to the 
marketplace of ideas, the marketplace theory, more broadly 
understood, protects the liberty to affect the marketplace in any 
way that we want to. Withholding support for an argument that 
one believes to be false can have just as much of a positive effect 
on others as adding support to an argument that one believes to 
be true. Those who disagree with a view and do not want to be 
couriers of that view may feel that the marketplace will be a 
better one if fewer join the chorus for that view. Thus, the right to 
withhold support for a message is fully compatible with a broad 
version of the marketplace theory. 
Second, Fried worries that the marketplace theory must lead 
to lessened protections for speech that courts deem “low-value,” 
such as obscenity.38 But this problem can also be avoided so long 
as we take the most expansive view of the marketplace theory. It 
is not up to judges but speakers to decide whether their speech 
will improve the marketplace of ideas. Thus, all speech should be 
protected if that speech is received by anyone else besides the 
speaker. It is the transmission of the speech from speaker to 
listener that is sufficient to make the speech worthy of protection, 
regardless of its content.39  
It is not, then, the marketplace theory per se that is 
problematic. It is rather a crimped view of the marketplace 
theory that puts at risk the protections Fried identifies. Fried’s 
critiques do not force us to abandon the marketplace of ideas as 
the core justification for protecting free speech.40 Rather, they 
                                                                                                     
 38.  See id. at 228 (“Civic republicans explain the historic exclusion of 
obscenity from constitutional protection on the ground that obscenity does not 
contribute to, but rather degrades, public (republican) discourse. Obscenity law 
is a puzzle . . . .”). 
 39.  There is an element of self-autonomy in this fuller version of the 
marketplace theory in that it can only be the speaker who decides that his 
speech will be a meaningful contribution to the marketplace of ideas.  
 40.  There are other reasons to be skeptical of a move to the self-autonomy 
theory. Most seriously, the self-autonomy theory, taken to its logical endpoint, 
might require First Amendment protection for even Category I speech 
restrictions. Suppose a choice of a particular courier service has a sentimental 
meaning to a speaker, but no effect whatsoever on a recipient. An 
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suggest that a broader view of the marketplace theory is 
necessary, a view I will explore in the next section. 
C. The Marketplace Theory as It Should Be Applied 
What is wrong with the marketplace theory as courts have 
most often applied it? Courts have confused the justification for 
protecting free speech with a judicial test for protecting free 
speech. We protect speech because there should be a robust 
marketplace of ideas, but that does not mean speech is worth 
protecting only if—in the judge’s view—it will make a difference 
in the marketplace of ideas.  
Courts have provided lessened protections for generalized 
speech (such as protests on free trade issues) and perceived 
“low-value” speech (such as adult entertainment) based on 
whether a judge thinks a regulation seriously alters the 
marketplace of ideas. The result has been self-defeating, for the 
simple reason that no court can accurately predict how valuable 
speech will be, or who will most benefit from hearing it.  
The only way to avoid this problem is for courts to treat all 
Category II restrictions alike. If a regulation affects the ability of 
a speaker “to choose one’s audience, [and] to speak with that 
audience,”41 then it is at least a Category II restriction. The 
listener-focused theory of the First Amendment is thus fully 
compatible with a bright-line, objective judicial test. Rather than 
asking how much the audience of a speaker has been affected, 
courts must simply shift to asking whether the audience of a 
speaker has been affected. 
This does not mean, however, that judges will be left with no 
meaningful role to play in adjudicating speech restrictions. First, 
even if a ban does constitute a Category II (or Category III) 
restriction, a court may still uphold that ban if it is absolutely 
                                                                                                     
environmental group, for example, might choose to distribute flyers using only 
bicycle couriers. Because such a choice is made in the course of speech and could 
be described as “self-actualizing,” the self-autonomy theory might hold that such 
a choice requires First Amendment protection. But choices that have absolutely 
no effect on listeners are implausible candidates for protection under the First 
Amendment, and a theory that might lead to such a result should be viewed 
with skepticism. 
 41.  Armijo, supra note 1, at 1690. 
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necessary to a government objective, the test that Professor 
Armijo proposes.42  
Second, courts must still engage in an enquiry to determine 
whether a facially Category I restriction actually rises, in 
practice, to the level of a Category II restriction. For example, to 
return to the hypothetical used in Part II, there is no difference in 
the experience of a recipient between receiving a letter by air or 
by truck. However, if a speaker is forced to use a less-preferred 
method, and that method is also more expensive, the speaker may 
not have the ability to send as many such letters as he otherwise 
would have. In this situation, the set of recipients has changed, 
and an apparent Category I restriction has risen to the level of 
Category II.43  
V. Why Courts Have Upheld Category III Restrictions 
Though we now have a plausible account of why the AAC 
doctrine is attractive in Category II cases, one important question 
remains: why has the AAC doctrine often been applied even in 
Category III cases? These cases, in which not just the audience of 
a message but the content of a message itself is altered, represent 
the most serious abridgment of free speech rights. They are 
situations where, as Armijo describes, a speaker is deprived “of 
her chosen mode of communication. The result of that restriction 
is that the speaker’s message is never subjected to the truth 
process at all.”44 For this reason, no version of the marketplace 
theory can justify a Category III restriction. To explain why 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See id. at 1728 
One way to achieve this goal is to apply an incompatibility test: when 
a speaker’ s expression is infringed by a law or regulation, a 
reviewing court should ask whether the infringed speech act—in the 
form the speaker intended to express it—is incompatible with the law 
and its purpose. The law will survive as applied to the speaker only if 
the speaker's mode is incompatible with the governmental interests 
asserted in the law’s support. 
 43.  One court, unfortunately, has upheld a ban that had precisely this 
effect. Despite acknowledging the burden it was placing on the speaker, the 
court wrote that he was not entitled to the “most cost-effective mode of 
communication.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 665 F.3d 486, 494 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 44.  Armijo, supra note 1, at 1700. 
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courts have nonetheless used the AAC doctrine to uphold several 
such restrictions, we must look for a culprit beyond the 
marketplace theory. 
The simplest explanation is that in some cases, it may be 
difficult for courts to determine whether a regulation actually 
constitutes a Category III restriction. Consider once again the 
facts of O’Brien.45 Suppose that there was no way for anyone in 
the audience to have known the difference between a real draft 
card and an otherwise identical fake draft card. Suppose 
O’Brien’s intended performance included no verbal explanation 
one way or the other. Suppose (assuming a counterfactual) that a 
prominent Supreme Court case had not brought significant 
attention to the question of whether O’Brien would be using a 
real or fake draft card. In this situation, it could well be that the 
message received by the audience would have been exactly the 
same whether the burned draft card had been real or fake. In this 
and similar cases, judges can disagree in good faith on whether a 
regulation will actually affect the perception of an audience, and 
thus whether a regulation falls in Category I or III. 
But these borderline cases do not fully explain why courts 
have often upheld Category III restrictions. Even when courts 
have acknowledged that certain prohibited conduct has 
expressive content, they have often minimized the importance of 
that conduct. In Clark v. Committee for Nonviolence,46 for 
example, the Supreme Court assumed that an overnight 
campground near the White House would have expressive 
content.47 Nonetheless, the Court upheld a denial of an overnight 
permit, dismissing the notion that “without overnight sleeping 
the plight of the homeless could not be communicated in other 
ways.”48 In this and other cases, the AAC doctrine has been a 
vehicle to minimize the importance of prohibited conduct to 
                                                                                                     
 45.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (“On the 
morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O’Brien and three companions burned 
their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston 
Courthouse.”). 
 46.  468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 47.  See id. at 293 (“We need not differ with the view of the Court of 
Appeals that overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is 
expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment.”). 
 48.  Id. at 295. 
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expression. Why are courts so tempted to engage in this 
minimization? 
Here is one possible answer: courts are reluctant to admit 
that illegal acts have an inherent and unique power to send a 
message. They are reluctant because once this is admitted, we 
are confronted with an uncomfortable fact: that enforcing the law 
unavoidably puts some messages at a disadvantage. Rather than 
making this admission, courts may find it easier to believe a 
useful fiction—that every message sent by a disruptive and 
illegal act could be made just as effectively by a legal act. 
Consider this uncomfortable line of reasoning: The most 
effective demonstration of opposition to a law is to publicly 
engage in an act of disobeying that law.49 The government 
nonetheless has an undeniably compelling interest in enforcing 
its laws. Thus, even though the government may not explicitly 
discriminate against speech on the basis of its content,50 simply 
enforcing a law will necessarily eliminate some of the most 
effective speech against that law. Since no comparable obstacles 
stand in the way of speech supporting current law—publicly and 
conspicuously obeying a law is not only allowed but encouraged—
a viewpoint in favor of the current state of the law will 
unavoidably be aided by the government. 
I do not necessarily think there is a solution to this problem; 
life is difficult in many ways for those who disagree with current 
law, and this is one of them. The marketplace of ideas will never 
be an entirely fair fight between those opposed to current 
regulations and those supporting them, and that is unfortunate.  
                                                                                                     
 49.  For a recent example, see Alicia Victoria Lozano, Marijuana Activists 
Gather for ‘Smoke-In’ at Rittenhouse Square, NBC 10 PHILADELPHIA (Jan. 20, 
2017), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news‌/local/Rittenhouse-Square-
Marijuana-Protest-411332455.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50.  Of course, a public act of lawbreaking may include a message 
promoting “imminent lawless action” (e.g., encouraging others to immediately 
engage in similar lawbreaking), which is not protected by the First Amendment 
under current precedent. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). But 
actions can carry more than one message simultaneously. Even if that portion of 
a demonstration advocating imminent lawbreaking is unprotected, that portion 
of the demonstration advocating a long-term change in the law itself remains 
protected as First Amendment expression. 
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Acknowledging that there is a problem is preferable to the 
alternative, however, which is to force oneself to believe that 
there is no problem at all. This is the optimistic view implied by 
holding that burning a fake draft card is just as effective in 
sending an anti-draft message as burning a real one.51 The result 
of this optimistic view, ironically, has been a greater acceptance 
of the AAC doctrine, and with it even less protection for 
protesters than they would otherwise have received.  
VI. Conclusion 
In this response, I have explained the distinction between the 
three categories of restrictions on “channels” of speech, a 
distinction that courts and scholars have not made as explicit as 
they should. Further, I have suggested why courts have 
frequently applied the ample alternative channels doctrine in 
Category II cases, as an attempt to improperly devalue speakers’ 
choices that do not make “enough” of an effect on the marketplace 
of ideas. I have suggested how judges could be more consistent in 
their treatment of Category II cases while also distinguishing 
them from Category I cases, which are implausible candidates for 
First Amendment protection. Finally, I have suggested that 
courts must be more realistic about the powerful expressive effect 
that many disruptive and illegal acts can have. Accepting this 
fact does not mean courts must allow widespread lawlessness 
(Armijo’s proposed incompatibility rule would still allow many 
necessary regulations to stand in the face of First Amendment 
claims), but it does mean courts would give full weight to the 
speech interests at stake. 
Professor Armijo’s powerful and provocative Article is sure to 
provoke many responses, as courts consider whether they have 
been following the wrong path for more than 40 years. My hope is 
that this response can also play a role in that process, helping 
courts to look at their own prior reasoning with a fresh eye and 
an open mind.  
 
                                                                                                     
 51.  Or, more relevant to today’s political climate, it is the view implied by 
believing that a “smoke-in” with fake marijuana would be just as effective as 
lighting up the real thing. 
